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Export dynamicsThis study explores the underlying factors that enable firms from developing countries to successfully export
differentiated goods to developed countries. The article describes four case studies of export emergence in
differentiated-good sectors in Argentina, namely wine, television programs, motorboats, and wooden furniture.
The case studies rely primarily on an extensive set of interviews.We find that consistent exporters to developed
countries adopt a new set of business practices that differ starkly from those that prevail in their domesticmarket.
In three of the sectors, an export pioneer led the adoption of these new practices. Export pioneers possessed tacit
knowledge about foreign markets, achieved through their previous embeddedness in the business community of
thosemarkets. Export emergence occurs as business practices diffuse throughout the sector. These findings point
to the importance of foreign market knowledge, relative to production knowledge, as the key constraint to
achieve consistent export to developed countries.
© 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
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ights reserved.consists in the sudden appearance of a large number of firms rapidly
making headways into international markets (Hausmann and Rodrik,
2003; Rhee andBelot, 1990). Someof the best-knowncases are the emer-
gence of textile exports from Bangladesh (Rhee, 1990), cut-flowers from
Colombia (Arbeláez et al., 2012; Rhee and Belot, 1990), and women's
shoes from Brazil (Schmitz, 1995). The volume of foreign sales that re-
sults from these processes is often substantial and sometimes accounts
for a large fraction of exports of developing countries. Since a hallmark
of countries that have industrialized in the last fifty years (e.g. Japan,
South Korea, and China) is the impressive growth of their exports, under-
standing instances of export emergence might be key to understanding
broader determinants of export development and late industrialization.
Established international trade theories cannot explain why exports
in specific sectors suddenly surge. While the Heckscher–Ohlin theory is
unable to explain why exports emerge in some sectors but not in others
that use similar factor intensities, the Ricardian theory is silent about the
potential drivers of productivity change that could ignite this process. In
turn, heterogeneous firm theories focused on the determinants and
3 Klepper and Rommel's (2011) analysis of the emergence of Bangladesh's garment in-
dustry also emphasizes production knowledge as the object of diffusion.
4 Sabel et al. (2012) document a number of Latin American case studies conducted un-
der a large project lead by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Most of our field
work was conducted in 2006 as part of this project.
5 The discrepancy may stem from the predominance in the IDB project of industries
with limited scope for product differentiation (e.g. cut flowers in Colombia, avocados in
Mexico). In those industries, coordination among producers, or between producers and
public agencies, would appear to be necessary to sustain activities that generate large ex-
ternalities (e.g. experimentswith new seeds) or that demand theprovision of public goods
(e.g. roads or air transport).
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sector enter export markets contemporaneously. An influential paper
by Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) (HR) develops a theory of sectoral
export emergence in which an export pioneer triggers a process of
export emergence by discovering that the production costs of a new
economic activity are low. As this theory only deals with homogeneous
goods, it does not capturewell-knownhindrances to exportingdifferen-
tiated products stemming from informational barriers (Rauch, 1999)
and the need to pay fixed and sunk costs (Roberts and Tybout, 1997).
As a result, it does not explainwhy and how export emergence in differ-
entiated products takes place. In particular, this theory does not deal
with the causes of the export emergence of such products to developed
countries, where those hindrances are higher.
Our work attempts to describe and explain this process. We con-
duct case studies of export emergence to developed countries in four
Argentine differentiated-good sectors: wines, television programs,
motorboats, andwooden furniture. These sectors span a broad diversity
of economic activities. In each of the cases,we interview relevant actors,
observe production processes, and collect statistical data. Based on the
data gathered through these various sources, we identify and describe
the main common patterns across the cases and construct hypotheses
to explain them.
One of ourmost salientfindings is that consistent exporters to devel-
oped countries (henceforth consistent exporters) adopt a new set of busi-
ness practices (henceforth export business practices). These practices are
radically different from those that prevail in the domestic market. They
involve adapting products to foreign demand and establishing informa-
tion channels to keep up to date about its evolving patterns. These
practices also require upgrading production processes to improve
quality, complying with stringent requirements of foreign distribu-
tors, and seeking to establish long-term relationships with them to
secure up-to-date information about foreign markets. Consistent ex-
porters also exhibit a commonmindset about the importance of adopting
export business practices and a discourse that implicitly assumes their
complementarity. This finding relates to a voluminous literature in inter-
national trade on the determinants of the exporting behavior of firms
(Melitz and Redding, forthcoming) that has so far overlooked the need
to change business practices to enter markets in developed countries
(henceforth developed markets). Although some papers point to the im-
portance of quality upgrading (e.g. Hallak and Sivadasan, forthcoming;
Sutton, 2007; Verhoogen, 2008), we find here that entering developed
markets requires that firms change a substantially broader set of business
practices.
We also find in our fieldwork that in three of our four industries an
export pioneer is the first to adopt this broad set of export business
practices and the first to consistently export to a developed country.
By contrast, in the wooden furniture industry we do not find an export
pioneer. Strikingly, the three export pioneers exhibit a previous expo-
sure to developed markets as a common feature in their background.
This is unlikely to be coincidental since this background is rare among
Argentine producers. Rather, it points to foreign market knowledge as a
critical constraint to achieving consistent exports to the developed
world. We argue that the embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985) of export
pioneers in the business community of their industries in developed
markets enabled them to acquire this tacit knowledge and eventually
envision a viable way of establishing an export business based on the
adoption of a new set of business practices. Export pioneers then trigger
a process of export emergence in their industries by spurring the diffu-
sion of those practices. They set an observable benchmark by demon-
strating that exporting consistently to developed countries is possible
and profitable. Their actions also convince others that exporting to
developed markets requires business practices to be changed.
The fact that export pioneers exhibit a substantial foreign exposure as
a common feature in their background questions the conventional focus
on productivity as the main determinant of firm exports (Bernard et al.,
2003; Melitz, 2003). This finding points to foreign market knowledge,not production knowledge, as the key for developing country firms to
establish a stable presence in developed markets. The finding is consis-
tent with recent case-study work showing that the possession of foreign
market knowledge is a distinguishing feature of large African producers
and exporters (Easterly and Reshef, 2010; Sutton and Kellow, 2010;
Sutton and Kpentey, 2012) andwith evidence thatmanagerswith previ-
ous experience at exporting firms increase the probability of exporting of
their current employers (Mion and Opromolla, 2010; Molina and
Muendler, 2013). It is also noteworthy that in none of our cases are
multinationals the export pioneers or one of the earliest followers.
As in HR, we also explain export emergence using a pioneer-
diffusion framework. However, we point to different drivers of this pro-
cess. Specifically, while export emergence in HR unravels as firms
learn the production costs of a new economic activity, our case studies
of differentiated-good sectors suggest that this process unravels as
firms acquire foreign market knowledge and adopt export business
practices.3 Hence, policies that spur discovery activity, as HR recom-
mend, may not be effective unless firms gain a prior understanding of
foreign markets and change their business practices to serve them. In
related work, Sabel et al. (2012) emphasize the resolution of coordina-
tion problems as the main trigger of export emergence.4 While we
also identify coordination problems in our case studies, we do not find
that export emergence is triggered by the resolution of this type of
problems.5 Freund and Pierola (2010), Iacovone and Javorcik (2010),
and Wagner and Zhaler (2013) develop statistical criteria to identify
export pioneers from customs data. Export business practices, however,
cannot be investigated following this approach since customs data are
silent about firms' business practices.
The cases of export emergence we describe here represent an alter-
nate means of international insertion relative to integration in global
value chains (GVC). Integration into GVC under contract manufacturing
arrangements that do not require performing design and marketing
tasks has helped firms in developing countries to overcome a lack of
foreign market knowledge (Gereffi, 1999; Abernathy et al. 1999).
Keesing and Lall (1990) document the role of intermediaries and inter-
national buyers in initiating this type of integration. These agents ap-
proach domestic producers, provide them with designs, and gradually
teach them how to change their products and business practices to con-
form to their demands. In our cases, the activity of this kind of agent is
notoriously scarce, potentially because this type of initial insertion in
GVC is more pervasive in countries where very low wages attract un-
skilled labor-intensive tasks in the production of standardized products.
In contrast, exported products in our four sectors exhibit an important
component of (domestically-performed) design.While gaining the ability
to design goods that appeal to consumers in developed markets may be
eventually achieved through upgrading within GVC (Gereffi, 1999),
often this form of upgrading does not occur (Humphrey and Schmitz,
2002). Thus, the type of export insertion that our case studies represent
might constitute a source of better, high paying jobs.
Althoughwe cannot ascertain howexport performance in the indus-
tries we study would have evolved in the absence of export pioneers,
our findings suggest that sustained export growth would not have
occurred or would have been substantially delayed in such cases. Also,
they suggest that the absence of an export pioneer, as in the wooden
furniture sector in our study, could be a potential explanation for why
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activity. Thus, identifying the main constraints to exporting and under-
standing why the background of export pioneers loosens those con-
straints may contribute to the design of public policies to promote
cross-sectoral diffusion and help firms deal with similar difficulties in
sectors where an export pioneer does not appear spontaneously.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe
our methodology. In Section 3, we provide a brief description of each
case study.6 In Section 4, we summarize and discuss the main common
findings across the cases. In Section 5, we provide concluding remarks.2. Methodology
This paper describes four Argentine case studies of export emer-
gence oriented to developed countries in differentiated-good sectors.
Based on these studies, we develop a set of related hypotheses about
the determinants of this phenomenon. Our case studies are based on a
variety of data sources (Yin, 1994), although primarily they rely on
the collection of qualitative data. In the presence of an understudied
phenomenon, the richness of qualitative data can provide insights
into complex processes that quantitative data cannot easily reveal
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). In each of the cases, we interview a
variety of relevant actors to obtain multiple perspectives (Helper,
2000) on how export emergence occurred and what enabled firms to
consistently export to developed markets. We triangulated this infor-
mation with information obtained from local trade associations, aca-
demic studies, industry reports, and customs data.
Ourmain criterion for choosing our four cases among differentiated-
good sectors exhibiting export emergence substantially oriented to
developed countries was to span the diverse set of activities that make
differentiated goods: agriculture-basedmanufacturing (wines), tradition-
al industrial manufacturing (wooden furniture), non-traditional industri-
al manufacturing (motorboats), and services (television programs).7
We did not include highly concentrated sectors in our study (e.g. auto-
mobiles and electronics), which have high entry barriers and require
large fixed outlays in R&D or advertising, nor did we include intermedi-
ate goods. While export emergence in those sectors might have differ-
ent determinants than the ones we emphasize here, our findings
might still apply, albeit partially, to these types of sectors. To identify
potential sectors, we used customs data to filter 4-digit Harmonized
System (HS) categories that satisfied the following criteria: (a) 40%
top percentile of export growth during the period 1991–2005; (b) at
least 1/3 of exports shipped to OECD countries; and (c) more than
10 million U.S. dollar exports in 2005. We obtained thirty sectors that
satisfied these criteria. Thirteen of them are classified by Rauch (1999)
as differentiated and the remaining seventeen as non-differentiated.8
The wine and wooden furniture industries were selected after
conducting this statistical analysis.9 The motorboats and television
program industries were identified based on one of the author's previ-
ous knowledge of the recent export emergence of these sectors in Ar-
gentina and selected after confirming that they also satisfied the
above criteria.10 The case of wooden furniture proved later not to be a
case of sustained export emergence to developed countries. This sector
displayed an export peak at the time of selecting our sectors (early6 Amore thorough description of these four case studies is provided in Artopoulos et al.
(2011b).
7 This sampling method, known as theoretical sampling (Glaser and Strauss, 1967,
Eisenhardt, 1989), can yield more illuminating results than random or stratified sampling
when the research purpose is to obtain new insights about an unexplored phenomenon
rather than test statistically a specific theory that attempts to explain it.
8 These sectors are displayed in Appendix Tables A.1 and A.2, respectively. Appendix A
describes our procedure in further detail.
9 Although Rauch (1999) classifieswines as reference-priced, most wine exported from
Argentina is a differentiated product.
10 An exception was made in the case of motorboats, which reported exports in 2005
slightly below 10 million U.S. dollars.2006) and hence passed our statistical criteria. However, exports to
the OECD consisted only of a temporary surge. From 2000 to 2008,
96% of export growth in the sector is explained by increased sales in
Latin America.
Our fieldwork was conducted over an eight-month period between
May andDecember of 2006. A few follow-up interviews and phone calls
were made afterwards. In total we conducted 40 interviews. While
fifteen of them were conducted with the owner or general manager of
a firm, the rest were donewith relevant actors in the industries studied.
Appendix Table A.3 provides detailed information about the interviews
we conducted. The interviews were semi-structured using open-ended
questions that varied according to the person interviewed and the
degree of advancement of our study. The interviews were conducted
in Spanish and generally lasted approximately one hour and a half. In
most cases, they were conducted at the production facility of the firm
and were accompanied by tours of these facilities. All interviews were
digitally recorded.
3. Description of case studies
This section describes the process of export emergence in the
wine, television program, motorboat and wooden furniture sectors in
Argentina. Each case first describes the export emergence phenomenon
in the context of world trends in the industry. Then, it illustrates the
business practices that firms had to change in order to establish a con-
sistent presence in developed markets. Finally, it recounts the business
history of the export pioneer, when there is one, and the emergence
of other exporters in the industry. All of the sectors except wooden
furniture were found to have an export pioneer that led the emergence
of exports in his respective sector. Appendix B describes the macroeco-
nomic context of these case studies and the evolution of Argentine
exports of differentiated products over the corresponding period.
3.1. Wines
Until a Chardonnay and a Cabernet Sauvignon from the United
States won a famous wine tasting competition in Paris in 1976, French
wines had dominated the high-quality market for this product. The
“new-world” style of winemaking behind these two wines enabled
countries from all over the world to begin shifting from the production
of customarily low-quality, old-world wines to higher quality, new-
world ones. The emergence of such wines led to a decline in the world-
wide market share of France. Between 1995 and 2008, this share
decreased from 48% to 34%. In contrast, the market share of wines orig-
inating in the new world, namely countries outside of Europe such as
Australia, the U.S., Chile, South Africa, and Argentina, increased from
16% to almost 39%. The advent of new-world wines was driven partially
by the emergence of new wine consumers in countries such as the
United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. The
emergence of these new consumers was accompanied by a shift in tra-
ditional wine-drinking countries such as France, Italy and Spain away
from table wines made with traditional, old-world techniques, toward
beer and new-world wines. Hence, even while the number of liters
per capita of wine consumed in these countries was declining, the con-
sumption of new-world wines continued to increase. The U.K. and the
U.S. are the largest importers, representing 17% and 14% of total wine
import value respectively. Germany, Belgium and Canada are the next
three largest importers. These five countries accounted for more than
half of total imports of wine in 2008.
Until the early 1990s the vast majority of wine production in Argen-
tinawas dedicated to the domestic market and nowinewas specifically
adapted to be sold abroad. After knowledge of how to make new-world
wines spread throughout the sector, exports increased dramatically
rising from US$ 25 million in 1993 to US$ 646 million in 2008 (Fig. 1).
During the same period the number of countries to which Argentina



















Fig. 1. Exports of wines: Argentina, 1993–2008.
22 A. Artopoulos et al. / Journal of Development Economics 105 (2013) 19–35was accompanied by a remarkable shift in destination markets. While
Latin America had accounted for 2/3 of exports in 1993, this same
share of exports was accounted for by OECD countries in 2008. By that
time Argentina had become the tenth largest exporter of wine in the
world, capturing slightly over 2% of the world market.
The wine industry in Argentina originated in colonial times and
largely focused on the production of old-world, fine wines. By the
1940s the production of less expensive and less elaborated table wines
began to replace the making of fine wines. Until the 1980s few
winemakers had traveled abroad with the intent of improving their
wines. Nevertheless, a handful of wineries began experimenting with
elaborating new-world wines during that decade. Their number was
limited because price controls combinedwith high inflation and govern-
ment subsidies for producing less expensivewinesmade experimenting
with high quality wines a relatively unattractive endeavor. Once the
Argentine economy stabilized and liberalized in the 1990s, manywiner-
ies updated their machinery and began undertaking such experiments.
Before the 1990s the vast majority of wineries in Argentina used
traditional old-world techniques for making wine that did not require
them to have any scientific understanding of either the way grapes
were grown or wine was made. Decisions about planting, harvesting
and fermenting were based almost solely on tradition. At the same
time, all except a handful of winemakers were unaware of the transfor-
mation that had occurred with the advent of new-world wines and
therefore they did not know how to adapt their wines to meet the
changes in tastes in the developed world. Even fewer of them knew
how to develop effective marketing campaigns or how to work with
distributors in these countries. In order to export successfully on a
continual basis, wineries had to change the way they did business in
all of these areas.
The taste of new-world wines was dramatically different than
the traditional table wines made in Argentina. These wines are more
sophisticated and elaborated than traditional old-world ones and
require a careful attention to quality. The challenge was complicated
not only by the fact that there were initially no domestic consumers
of this product but also by the fact that the intricacies of the tastes of
drinkers of new-world wines across the world differ and change over
time. For example, although new-world wines are generally fruiter,
more aromatic, lower in alcohol content, and less aggressive on the
palette than old-world wines, U.S. consumers prefer more aging in oak
barrels, while European consumers prefer wines with higher alcoholic
content. A new-world wine that wins a prize in one country can be
deemed rough by consumers elsewhere. Consequently, wineries had
to understand these differences, while at the same time tracing howtastes in each country changed. Many times they hired international
consultants in this field, “flying winemakers”, to help them understand
and satisfy these different and changing tastes.
To meet the higher standards of consumers of new-world wines,
new types of grapes and new kinds of wine had to be produced. This
implied abandoning traditional artisan ways and embracing scientific
methods developed by new-world producers in other parts of the
globe. The new-world way of making wines requires vineyards to
grow skinny grapes with little liquid, instead of the large, juicy ones
used for old-world wines. Wineries also have to upgrade their opera-
tions by focusing more on quality and less on quantity, and undertake
careful scientific studies of land to see which type of grape best suits
its characteristics. Argentina is particularly well suited tomeet a variety
of demands in terms of taste because its soil can accommodate 28
different types of grapes.
At the same time, themethod inwhichwines aremadewas dramat-
ically altered with the introduction of new machinery such as stainless
steel tanks. They enable enologists to control the exact temperature at
which fermentation occurs. Enologists have to oversee the day-to-day
operations of the fermentation process, while at the same time
cooperating with agronomists to ensure that the vineyards they use
will yield the type of grapes desired. They bridge the gap between
what is desired by their winery's clients and what is physically possible
given the available raw materials. Enologists often seek the help of
flying winemakers to help them introduce the appropriate changes in
their wineries and vineyards. Wineries seeking to make the transition
to the production of new-world wines have to make significant invest-
ments in equipment such as refrigeration systems, grinding centrifuges,
numeric presses, pumps, stainless steel containers, and 225 liter oak
barrels.Manywineries in Argentina continued to use old-world produc-
tion techniques and focus on the domestic market well throughout the
1990s. They were interested in volume rather than taste and therefore
tended to over irrigate their fields, creating higher producing grapes
with less concentrated flavors and lower quality.
Even if a winery understands what types of wine it has to produce
and how to produce them, it will have difficulty selling new-world
wines abroad if it does not understand how to work with distributors
andhow tomarket its products in foreign countries. The limited number
of wineries that had previously sold old-world wines abroad before the
introduction of new-world techniques in Argentina generally sold their
product as a commodity and therefore did not have towork closelywith
distributors. New-worldwineries that successfully export their wines to
the developed world know that the practices they use on the domestic
market will not work with international distributors in these countries.
Unlike in the domestic market, these firms work closely with distribu-
tors and pay careful attention to their specific demands regarding issues
such as back-office procedures. For example, they know that interna-
tional distributors in developed countries do not accept renegotiating
terms and conditions, a common practice in the domestic market.
These international buyers also expect certain basic marketing prac-
tices. For instance, wineries have to design labels that inform customers
about the region where a particular wine was made and the general
characteristics of its flavor. They also have to ensure that the labels on
their bottles do not peel off and that the boxes that contain them are
not damaged and come with proper markings. These practices initially
represented challenges for wineries, as domestic distributors did not
have such requirements. Nevertheless, if wineries proved capable in
making these changes, they often found that their distributors were
willing to help them keep up to date on evolving trends. To sell wines
in the developed world wineries have to put advertisements in interna-
tional wine journals and not solely in general magazines as is the prac-
tice on the domestic market. Wineries that want to export also have to
develop an icon wine, an expensive wine that demonstrates their capa-
bilities. Although the expected profits from such wines are generally
low due to their limited turnover, they are used as a marketing tool to
promote the less expensive wines in a winery's portfolio.
23A. Artopoulos et al. / Journal of Development Economics 105 (2013) 19–35Nicolás Catena Zapata was the first Argentine wine producer to
systematically adopt the practices outlined above. He was also the first
to achieve consistent sales of new-world wines to developed countries
and the first to sell an icon wine in a developed country for a price of
$80. His winery was also the only one to achieve unabated export
growth to the OECD from 1994 to 2006. His efforts to develop a new-
world wine made in Argentina began after he returned from a three-
year stay at the Department of Agriculture and Resource Economics at
U.C. Berkeley in the early 1980s where he taught basic microeconomics
as a visiting professor under the auspice of a former classmate at
Columbia University. During this time he visited a number of wineries
in Napa Valley, befriending winemakers that had developed and
mastered new-world winemaking techniques. One of the most impor-
tant acquaintances he made was Robert Mondavi, one of the leaders
of the new-world wine revolution in California.
Nicolás Catena Zapata had taken control over his family winery in
1963 while he was doing a PhD in Economics at Columbia. He traveled
back and forth from New York to Mendoza, the center of wine produc-
tion in Argentina, on a regular basis during his studies. By 1980 his
winerywas one of the largest in theworld, selling 38% of thewines con-
sumed in Argentina. A few years later he had sold most of his family's
wineries, while retaining the highest-quality one. He used the knowl-
edge he gained in California to totally revamp his high quality winery
to make new-world wines. According to Nicolás, his decision to under-
take this transformation was not based on a detailed economic analysis
of potential markets but rather on a desire to emulate the success he
had witnessed in the United States. The first wines he exported from
Argentina in the new-world style were a Chardonnay and a Cabernet
Sauvignon. He specifically chose to make these two types of wines
because they were the same varietals that had won the tasting in Paris
in 1976. After making these wines, Catena realized that it was critical
to work with wine journalists to promote his products and that he
needed to lead the promotion efforts himself. Part of hismarketing cam-
paign included contracting two of the best Argentine tango dancers and
traveling to various cities in the United States, his primary target
market. He decided to use tango dancers because it was practically the
only cultural icon from Argentina that people in the United States
knew and he wanted them to associate the quality of his wine with
the quality of these dancers.
The boom in the number of wineries that began to adapt new-world
production techniques began shortly after Catena sold an icon wine in
the United States in 1997. Although the growth in exports would
dramatically increase after the currency devaluation in Argentina in
2002, the ability of Nicolás Catena Zapata to make an icon wine in
Argentina that was highly praised in the United States by such presti-
gious trade magazines as the Wine Spectator led to a dramatic influx
of foreign capital into this industry. According to Catena Zapata, he set
the model to be followed even for well-known multinationals like
Chandon, one of France's largest producers of wine and champagne11:
“They (Chandon) followed me in everything I did. They confessed
that they copied me even in the places where I bought new
vineyards”.
Peñaflor, one of the most important wineries in Argentina, began to
export Trapiche, one of its most traditional wines, in 1965. However,
this wine was not tailored to the tastes of markets in the developed
world. It was remade according to new-world standards only after
this winery was fully bought out by Donald, Lufkin and Jenrette, an
international investment group, in 2002. Besides changing the wines
made at Peñaflor, this investment group also dramatically transformed
the winery's back office procedures. Only in 2005 did Peñaflor export
more wine in terms of overall value than Catena Zapata. Like Peñaflor,11 “Me siguieron (Chandon) totalmente. Me lo confesaron que me seguían hasta donde
yo compraba las viñas.”two of the other top exporters in this sector were companies owned
by international investors. One of these wineries, Norton, began its
transformation in 1989 when it was bought by an Austrian investor.
The other international winery, Trivento, was opened in Argentina by
the Chilean winery Concha y Toro in 1997. One of the earliest followers
was the domestic winery Familia Zuccardi. Although this winery also
experimented with new-world wines in the 1980s, it consistently
lagged behind Catena Zapata in terms of quality and price. Domino
de Plata, another leading domestic winery, was cofounded by Pedro
Marchevsky, the enologist that led the transformation of Catena Zapata's
wineries.
3.2. Television programs
The international market for television programs was transformed
significantly with the advent of formats in the 1990s. This novel product
offered a new set of countries the opportunity to participate in amarket
traditionally dominated by theUnited States. Formats are essentially the
idea, main structure and salient features of a television program. Unlike
traditional canned programs, they are not designed for the audience of a
particular country. Instead, formats are designed to be adapted to the
cultural idiosyncrasies of different countries. This flexibility enabled
formats to capture a substantial portion of the television market world-
wide. Between 2001 and 2004, the number of shows using formats
grew by a third and the broadcasted hours of programs based on format
expanded by 22%. From 2004 to 2008, worldwide sales of formats went
from 6.4 to 9.3 billion Euros (FRAPA, 2009). The advent of formats
enabled European companies to significantly challenge the international
dominance of the U.S. in this industry. Great Britain is currently the
leading exporter in this sector, with 98 formats exported in 2008,
followed by the U.S. with 56 and the Netherlands with 23. Half of the
formats exported are game shows,while the other half consists predom-
inantly of reality and talk shows. Althoughfiction formats are a relatively
small portion of the industry, it is the most important genre of format
exports from Argentina.
Despite a long tradition in creative filmmaking, until the 1990s
exports of television programs made in Argentina were limited. During
the first half of the twentieth century, the country had been a successful
exporter of films, selling themmainly to Spain and Latin America. How-
ever, until the last decade of that century, exports consisted largely of a
small number of soap operas sold to other countries in Latin America,
Spain, and nontraditional markets such as Russia and Israel. Exports
were limited because in general Latin American soap opera viewers
did not find the Argentine Spanish accent appealing. The emergence of
formats enabled Argentine firms to overcome this problem. Indepen-
dent production companies that had emerged from the privatization
of the television industry in Argentina during the early 1990s were the
first to take advantage of this new opportunity. Later, multinational
production companies acquired a number of domestic companies to
serve the domestic and foreign markets.
Argentine television exports span thewhole range of related services,
from selling format rights to consulting and production services. Official
statistics for exports in this industry are difficult to obtain because
they are not processed through customs. Consequently, the value of
TV-format exports can only be estimated. Exports of audiovisual services,
the general category that encompasses television formats, have in-
creased from US$ 17.5 million in 1996 to US$ 304.7 million in 2007
(see Fig. 2). Between 2006 and 2008 companies in Argentina exported
59 different versions of 26 original formats. Nevertheless, the actual
revenue from activities in this sector is difficult to estimate as consulting
services are the most lucrative part of this business and reports of such
activities fall under a general category that includes a number of other
businesses. Between 2006 and 2008 producers of formats in Argentina
exported their products to 15 different locations worldwide.
Although formats are usually first used in a firm's domestic market,
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Fig. 2. Exports of audiovisual services: Argentina, 1996–2007.
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ically different from how these activities are performed for traditional
programs. The making of a television program based on a format is
divided into two distinct parts, the creation of the format and its adap-
tation and production for a particular country. The former involves the
creative activities in designing the structure, the plot, and the themes
to be covered. The latter encompasses adapting the script andproducing
the actual program adding critical idiosyncratic elements specific to the
market in which the program is to be aired. Essentially, formats are
designed to be filled with different cultural content. This sector differs
from the others discussed in this study because it involves the design
of a generic product followed by its customization to the idiosyncrasies
of the target country in the production process. Not every successful
television program can be turned into a format. Desperate Housewives
was a failure in Argentina largely because this country lacks the typical
suburban middle-class housewife on which this series is based. In
contrast, Argentina's Montecristo has been a success worldwide be-
cause it has neither culturally specific characters nor culturally specific
plot components. The separation of design and production in a format
requires programs with a strong structure so that they can be easily
adapted to the cultural idiosyncrasies of other markets. By contrast,
the design and production of a traditional program oriented to the do-
mestic market are inherently intertwined because key design decisions
need to be made when the program is being filmed. According to a top
manager of one of the exporting companies, domestic firms often ap-
pear to be unaware of the need to adapt programs to foreignmarkets12:
“…they try to sell the same (programs) abroad that they sell here…
and it is not like that. You need to pay your dues, get to know what
the other one likes. Television is not the same in every country”.
When producing formats, firms systematize different aspects of the
production process. In fact, the rights to a format include a full set of
specifications from the dressing of actors and hosts to specific features
of illumination and editing. Those specifications need to be clear so
that they can be easily applied by production crews in other countries.
When a firm produces a format in a foreign location, it has to coordinate
the activities of a variety of local and foreign suppliers. Traditionally
programsweremade entirely within the four walls of the firm. Further-
more, firms that export often require the assistance of specialized con-
sultants, as information about specific cultural traits can be extremely12 “…intentan vender afuera lo mismo que hacen acá…y no es así. Tenés que pagar un
derecho de piso, saber qué es lo que le gusta al otro. No es la misma televisión en todos
los países.tacit and therefore difficult to obtain for a company seeking to produce
a format for a foreign country. Finally, firms that successfully export
formats also need to upgrade some parts of the production process.
For example, Promofilm made an important investment in editing
equipment to produce formats.
Companies in Argentina export formats by selling them directly to
potential clients through their own sales offices, commercializing
them through international brokers or merging with an international
company. To pursue any of these options firms need to have a strong
reputation. Trade fairs such as the Cannes Marche International des
Films et des Programmes pour la TV, la video, le Cable et les Satellites
(MIPCOM) and the meeting of the National Association of Television
Program Executives (NATPE) are venues in which companies can
drawon their reputations tomeet newor existing clients, while keeping
themselves up to date on new trends. Firms often try to build their
reputation by providing better-known firms critical services in adapting
a format to a particular country.
Horacio Levin was the first person to consistently export formats to
developed countries and the most important one in leading the trans-
formation of business practices in this industry. He began his company,
Promofilm, as an importer of cartoons and animated films. During this
stage of his business he developed international contacts by traveling
to international trade fairs on a regular basis, an unusual practice in
this industry at that time. Before beginning to design formats, he
imported them fromother countries and adapted them to the Argentine
market. Levin bought his first format, Sorpresa y media, from a Spanish
company. Later, he sold this program to television channels in Brazil,
Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. At the same time, he was training
many individuals that would later become critical managers in other
television production firms. Levin was not the actual owner of CQC
(Caiga Quien Caiga), the first format to be exported from Argentina in
1996. However, he played a critical role not only in convincing the
owners of this program that it was possible to export it as a format
but also in actually facilitating its sale to his Spanish associates at
Globomedia. Promofilm began working with Globomedia in 1995. The
Spanish company acquired a fraction of Promofilm in 2002 and com-
pleted its acquisition in 2005. Levin's years of experience in this industry
led him to believe that associatingwith a Spanish companywas the best
way to compensate for the fact that Argentina lacked international
credibility in the television industry. According to Levin, his new partners
would also serve as a source of information about evolving trends13:
“My Spanish partners keptme abreast of what was happening in the
world, we were (in Argentina) far from the world”.
In 1998, the two companies jointly bought the format rights for the
Swedish reality show Expedition Robinson, known as Survivor in the
United States. Each partner adapted it to their respective countries.
Promofilm would come to open a production facility in the Caribbean
to produce this program for a number of countries including Russia,
Hungary, Italy, the United Kingdom, and other South American coun-
tries. The first new format that Promofilm created, Protagonistas de
Novela, was exclusively developed for Telemundo in the United States.
It would later be exported to Greece and five Latin American countries
without ever being sold in Argentina. In 2005, Promofilm Globomedia
was bought out by Grupo Arbol, a Spanish media conglomerate.
Levin's actions in this business convinced other firms, including
multinationals, that firms located in Argentina were capable of success-
fully exporting formats on a consistent basis to the developed world.
Horacio Levin actively promoted the diffusion of his knowledge about
the format business in Argentina. The real growth in this industry
would not occur until the first few years of the 21st century when
multinational companies, following the precedent set by Levin, began13 “Mis asociados me mantenían al tanto de lo que pasaba en el mundo, nosotros
















Fig. 3. Exports of motorboats: Argentina, 1994–2008.
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company founded in 1994, acquired a 65% stake in P&P, an Argentine
producer of formats while, in 2007, Dori Media bought 50% of Central
Park Productions. Telefé, a Spanish company that owns a television
station in Argentina, started by importing and adapting formats to the
Argentine market. After the success at adapting international formats
to Argentina's domestic markets, it started to create its own formats
and sell them abroad.
3.3. Motorboats
Themotorboat industry has largely been dominated by producers in
developed countries selling to consumers in these countries. Through-
out the late 1990s this industry had primarily consisted of small- to
medium-sized firms that used small-scale production facilities to
make boats for specific market niches. By the beginning of the 21st
centurymany of these firms began tomerge into larger business groups
that abandoned small batch production for nichemarkets and switched
to making mass-produced, relatively large boats, for a broader market.
The vast majority of the producers and exporters of motorboat are
located in the developed world. The largest exporters in 2008 were
Italy (25%), Germany (16%), the United Kingdom (15%), and the United
States (12%). Consumption and imports are also highly concentrated in
the developed world. These countries accounted for 92% of all motor-
boat sales in 1996 (E Composites, 2006). The consolidation of this in-
dustry offered firms located in developing countries such as Argentina
a chance to compete in market niches that were left relatively under-
served by these new business groups. One such underserved market
niche consisted of medium-sized motorboats, the market segment
targeted by Argentine firms.
Argentine firms find exporting particularly challenging because
almost all boats sold on the domestic market are designed for fresh
water, while the demand for medium-sized boats in the developed
world is almost exclusively for salt-water vehicles. Fresh-water boats
cannot be used in salt water because their hulls corrode quickly if they
are exposed to salt. Salt-water boats are uncommon in Argentina as
the vast majority of motorboats are used in the River Plate, the widest
fresh-water estuary in the world. Given that a significant proportion of
the Argentina population lives in Buenos Aires, a city located along the
River Plate, the vast majority of boats in Argentina are designed to be
used on day trips. By contrast, boats bought in the developed world
are generally designed to be used on longer trips, andhence are custom-
arily equipped with amenities to ensure comfort in such excursions.
Before the late 1990s, firms in this sector concentrated almost exclu-
sively on the domestic market. Exports were rare and sporadic. By
that time, sales abroad began to increase significantly, reaching US$
3 million in 2002 and US$ 15 million in 2007 (see Fig. 3). Even though
important parts such as engines are still imported, exports were helped
by the devaluation of the Argentine peso in 2002. In 2008 exports
declined due to theworld economic crisis that began in that year. This cri-
sis disproportionately effected the consumption of luxury goods. Three
out of the five largest importers from Argentina are OECD countries:
Spain (17%), Italy (15%), and the United States (12%).
Firms in this sector that export consistently to the developed world
adjust their production capabilities to make products designed specifi-
cally for these markets. Besides making sturdy, comfortable boats that
resist corrosive salt water, successful exporters in this sector design
and engineer their boats to meet the demands of customers in these
markets. They also incorporate distinct luxury items (e.g. expensive
speed gages) designed by companies such as Porsche and Ferrari into
their boats for export as this type of add-on is sought by consumers in
these countries but not by domestic consumers. Successful exporters
know that they have to meet the challenging demands and idiosyncra-
sies of the countries to which they export in the developed world. Thus,
they continually change the design and furniture of their boats to meet
changes in themarket. For example, consumers in these countries haverecently started to demand interior furniture with rounded shapes that
are made of pale wood, instead of the dark, square furniture that was
common in thepast. They have also begun demanding a greater number
of appliances, better quality materials in the interior parts of their boats
and framelesswindows instead of traditional portholes. New firms from
a developing country cannot expect to compete with top brands such as
Azimut and Ferretti because brand reputation is a key element in the
purchasing decision of traditional luxury consumers. However, they
can address specific niches with less well-known brands. Although
brand reputation is also important in the Argentine market, consumers
in this country are far less demanding in terms of add-ons and interior
designs.
Successful exporters employ designers who understand the tastes
and needs of foreign markets and can design boats that meet those
tastes and needs. For example, they frequently use stainless steel
fenders instead of plastic ones and engrave the brand's name in steel
rather than simply painting it on the deck as is customary on the domes-
ticmarket. Unlike in thismarket, boats that are exported require detailed
junctions and corners to meet the requirements of customers in these
countries. Although producers of these boats in the developed world
rely on serial production using standardized matrices, such standardiza-
tion is not necessary for the Argentine market because local consumers
tolerate the imperfections that occur with artisan styles of production.
Exporters from Argentina do not have the sales volume to justify serial
production and standardized matrices. Instead, they use computer-
aided design (CAD) to help them design their products in a way that
enables mistakes to be reduced in the production process. At the same
time, exporters to developed countries rely on foreign suppliers for
parts such as propellers and axles because quality suppliers of these
parts are difficult to find in Argentina and their international clients
have quality expectations higher than those on the domestic market.
They also use standardized components such as electrical circuits and
provide their clients with detailed technical information so that their
boats can be worked on by technicians in any part of the world.
In order to keep up on trends, owners of firms that export to the de-
veloped world often attend international boat shows in Genoa, Venice,
and Barcelona. They provide information about these trends to their de-
signers and engineers so that they can tailor their products to the new
needs of specific countries and market niches. Going to these shows
also gives these owners a chance to create new business relationships
or build on previous ones. One of the reasons why successful exporters
of boats fromArgentina tend toworkwith a limited number of suppliers
and journalists is their desire tomaintain a constantflowof information.
These firms also have to pay careful attention to differences in ways of
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the founding family as the company name, companies that export tend
to change their brand names so that they are more appealing in foreign
advertisements.
Luis López Blanco was the first individual to export consistently to
the OECD. The company he founded, Compañia Constructora de
Embarcaciones (CCE), has been the largest exporter to the OECD in
this industry since 2000. He has exported his boats to Germany, France,
Italy, Spain, Norway, Greece and Venezuela. López Blanco was formerly
a local representative of foreign brands of motorboats and motorboat
engines and did not have any background in production. He founded
CCE in 2000 with the explicit goal of exporting boats from Argentina.
He applied the knowledge of foreign markets he had gained during
his time as a local representative of foreign brands by focusing on
mid-sized boats. He learnt about foreign markets by going to corporate
meetings as a distributor of Cummings motors and Azimut motorboats.
Later, at boat shows, he developed key relations with distributors and
sellers. To produce a boat for markets in the developed world he used
plush interior designs and instruments, applied the latest production
techniques, and worked closely with foreign distributors. Sometimes
finding that traditional input suppliers in the motorboat industry
were not responsive to demands for quality upgrading, he resorted to
suppliers from other industries for needed parts, such as windshields,
aluminum pieces, and CAD/CAM services. His first model, called
Aqualum 35, was developed in 2000with the aim of emulating industry
leaders such as Azimut and Ferretti. Unlike the boats produced by other
domestic firms, the Aqualum 35 was equipped with Italian appliances.
The rationale behind the use of imported appliances was not only to
employ premium brands, but also to set foreign customers at ease by
providing appliances that they already recognized and trusted and
that could be easily replaced or repaired. In a similar vein, he decided
to use the Latin word Aqualum as his brand in order to appeal to con-
sumers throughout Europe. López Blanco was aware that people in
Europe may be hesitant to buy such a big ticket item from a country
with no international reputation in this industry. Hence, he took various
actions to confront this disadvantage. For example, he decided to tem-
porarily sell his boats abroad below cost and to add quality assurance
services that were new to Argentina's industry. On one occasion he
evendecided to send a technician to theUnited Arab Emirates to rework
an instrument panel for a client who was unsatisfied with it. His efforts
to avoid this type of concerns were broad14:
“We imitated the style of our Italian distributor in things such as the
technical data, brochures, and even our personal appearance, …we
took care of our clothes, … to be like one of them (…) we offered a
product similar to theirs, with a clear Italian orientation, equipped
with international appliances, …there are no surprises, one lifts the
lid of the engine room and the engine room looks like that of any
boat from there.”
While the median number of exporters per year during the 1990s
was only one firm, this number had reached eighteen by 2006. Never-
theless, the two largest exporters, CEE and Altamar Yachts, accounted
for more than 50% of total exports in this industry. Like CEE, Altamar
Yachts was founded with the explicit purpose of focusing on the export
market, even though it originally focused on MERCOSUR countries. Its
first successful export to a developed country occurred in 2003. This
company is not only the largest exporter overall but also exports more
to OECD countries than any other firm. Similar to Altamar, Klase A also14 “Nos presentamos con el mismo estilo de nuestro distribuidor, los datos técnicos, un
folleto parecido al de ellos, en nuestro aspecto tratamos de parecernos a ellos, cuidamos
nuestra vestimenta, (…) para parecernos a uno de ellos (…) llevamos un producto
parecido al de ellos, con clara orientación italiana, con todos los equipos internacionales,
no hay sorpresas, uno levanta la tapa de la sala de máquinas y parece la sala de máquinas
de cualquier barco de allá.”started by exporting to countries in MERCOSUR. Nevertheless, it did
not make its first sale to an OECD country until 2004. All three of
these firms believe that the emergence of new exporting firms would
be beneficial for their own company because it would enable Argentina
to gain greater recognition as a reliable producer of high quality boats. In
fact, when he was chair of the chamber of commerce for this industry,
Lopez Blanco actively tried to convince other firms of the importance
of changing their business practices in order to export. Nevertheless,
the pay-off for his efforts has yet to be realized.
3.4. Wooden furniture
Although exports from the wooden furniture sector in Argentina
doubled during the 2000s, Latin America was responsible for 96% of
this export growth. Unlike the other three sectors, sales to developed
countries only witnessed temporary growth. Toward the end of the
2000s exports from this sector had fallen back to their previous levels
(see Fig. 4). Developed countries are the largest worldwide importers
in this industry, with the United States accounting for almost 20% of
world imports. On the export side, Italy had long been the largest ex-
porter until China overtook it in 2004. By 2008 the ten largest exporters
included both developed nations such as Germany, Denmark, the U.S.,
and Canada as well as countries with relatively low wages such as
Vietnam. Nevertheless, Italy continues to be the country that exhibits
the highest export unit value. It retains this position by relying on flexi-
blemachines and skilled workers to produce quality products instead of
using automated machines to produce standardized furniture, as is the
case in lower income countries. Despite the fact that Argentinemanufac-
turers would face significant difficulties competing with the quality of
furniture made in Italy or with the low price of standardized furniture
from countries with inexpensive labor, an opportunity for them seems
to be present in a new medium-quality market segment of contempo-
rary furniture. This segment emerged in the 1990s, and consists of cus-
tomers who buy stylish furniture that is not mass-produced but which
is not as expensive as higher-end products.
Although Argentina has a long history of producing furniture for its
domestic market, exports were practically nil until the 1990s. Tradition-
ally, firms in Argentina only exported furniture when the local market
was declining, limiting their exports to products designed for this mar-
ket. Only in the first few years of the 21st century did some Argentine
firms begin adapting the designs of their products for the developed
world. In the 1990s the vastmajority offirms took advantage of the con-
vertibility plan to buy sophisticated, flexible machinery that could be
used to semi-customize products. The use of flexiblemachinery enabled
these firms to quickly alter their production processes tomake products
in new sizes and dimensions. Thus, they could adapt their production to
keep up with trends in markets like the U.S., the developed country2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Year
US & Canada Europe
Latin America Others
Source: COMTRADE
Fig. 4. Exports of wooden furniture by destination: Argentina, 2000–2008.
15 A previous version of this paper (Artopoulos et al., 2011a) labeled this set of business
practices “the export business model”.
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majority of firms in other countries that export wooden furniture,
Argentine producers do not need to import wood.
Some companies understand the differences, albeit usually slight,
between the tastes in Argentina and those of countries like the United
States. For instance, furniture in the latter country tends to be larger
than in Argentina because houses are generally bigger. Differences in
tastes can even exist between different regions in the United States.
For example, consumers on the west coast prefer darker stains, while
those on the east coast prefer lighter ones. Some companies that
exported to the United States kept up to date on trends in this market
because they knew that U.S. consumers of contemporary furniture
change the furnishing in their houses on average once every five years.
Changes in style are much less common in Argentina, where on average
customers change their furniture only once every thirty years. Variations
in styles in theUnited States can be rather subtle. For example, whenflat
screen televisions first appeared in that country, families wanted furni-
ture to accent this appliance. Now that such products are ubiquitous,
they want furniture that hides it. One Argentine firm keeps up to date
with such changes by contracting international consultants. Another
firm actually sent their designer to Italy to take courses on design so
that she could learn to adapt furniture to tastes in the developed world.
Some firms in this sector introduced changes in their production
processes in order to satisfy quality standards of consumers in the
developed world. None of the firms that we interviewed actually
bought new machinery or contracted workers with better skills in
order to meet these standards. Instead, the firms that upgraded their
production generally did so by just improving the lighting of their facil-
ities and ensuring that their workers paid careful attention to how they
performed their tasks. Workers need to pay careful attention to what
they are doing and have the light necessary to carefully observe their
actions because the quality standards of consumers in developed mar-
kets are higher than those in Argentina. For example, measurements
for furniture exported to the developed world have to be exact and
staining has to be consistent. These attributes are not important for
furniture sold on the domestic market. In general furniture factories in
Argentina are poorly lit, thereby limiting the ability of workers to pay
close attention to what they are doing. Even experienced managers
seem notably unaware of the attention consumers and distributors
pay to these details in the developed world.
Distributors of contemporary furniture look for potential partners
that can build products that they are seeking rather than looking for
finished products on the market. Once they establish a relationship
with a producer, they help them by providing insights on how to
improve their goods. Although companies that value such input invest
time in building relationships with their distributors, most firms in
this sector are unwilling to make such a commitment. Similarly, trade
fairs in this sector were traditionally instances for wooden furniture
manufacturers to actually sell their products. Now they are more
oriented to providing firms opportunities to learn about recent shifts
in tastes and become acquaintedwith distributors. Only a fewArgentine
firms value participating in design competitions at trade fairs such as
the biannual one in High Point, North Carolina. Those firms design and
manufacture a new piece of furniture specifically for this event. Even if
firms make all of these changes, they will not be successful in selling
their furniture in the developed world unless they carefully obey the
letter of their contracts, be they formal or informal agreements. This
type of behavior proves challenging for many firms because in the
domestic market they are accustomed to loosely interpreting any type
of agreement. Many firms even seek to renegotiate the terms of their
already-signed contracts. In contrast to foreign markets, distributors in
Argentina are accustomed to their suppliers delaying shipments and
attempting to change the terms on which they are paid. Firms that
seek to export on a consistent basis to developed markets sometimes
go to extravagant lengths to overcome the negative image Argentine
firms have in this sector. One company actually opened a warehousein Los Angeles because the only way some of their distributors would
buy furniture from this company was if they could inspect their
products personally and take immediate delivery.
Prominent firms and associations in this industry contend that Jorge
Etchebehere, a commercial agent, is the person who knows the most
about how to successfully export to the United States. He is particularly
well known for understanding how products need to be adapted to the
market in this country. He became interested in the culture of the
United States after having participated in a three-month student
exchange in New Jersey when he was 16 years old. One of his first
jobs in Argentina was working for a company that bought fertilizers
and seeds from Monsanto. In this job he acted as an informal cultural
consultant for U.S. representatives of this latter company. Later, he
would come to work as a foreign sales representative for Genoud, a
relative large furniture manufacturer in Argentina. In 1997 he started
his own trading company. Through this company he was able to help
Fontenla, one of the domestic leaders in this industry, make its first ex-
port to theUnited States. He also assisted another leader in this industry,
Mehring, in establishing its first contacts in that country. Together with
two U.S. sales representatives he had initially contracted as consultants,
Etchebehere formed Argentine Resource Goods (ARG) in 2003 as a
means for facilitating exports of furniture to the United States. This
company represented eight Argentine firms located dispersedly over
the country and operated a warehouse and a 300 square meter show-
room inWashington, DC. However, only a few years after it was formed,
ARG was dissolved. According to Etchebehere this company failed
because many of the companies he represented either did not pay suffi-
cient attention to the type of details in the production process outlined
above and/or failed to fulfill their contracts in the manner expected by
U.S. buyers. Etchebehere also complained that some of the firms with
which he worked did not deliver their products on time. He was not
willing to try to obtain the financial resources he would have needed
to build his own manufacturing facility.
In 2006, the eight largest exporters in this sector accounted for more
than 40% of total exports. Although each of these exporters had changed
some business practices in order to export, none of them had systemat-
ically implemented all, or even most, of these practices. Also, unlike in
the other three sectors none was able to establish a consistent presence
in a developed country. One of the most prominent exporters in this
sector, Mehring, made significant changes to the way in which their
products for export were designed and produced but failed to establish
solid relationships with distributors. Ivope, the largest exporter in this
sector, was founded by twoArgentines and eventually sold to a furniture
producer and retailer of Peruvian originwhom they serendipitouslymet
in Los Angeles, the city in which he was living. Nevertheless, Ivope's
export activity is limited to supplying that buyer in the U.S. west coast.
4. Generalizations from the case studies
The case studies described in the previous section present a number
of common features which constitute themain findings of this study. In
this section, we describe these findings. We also discuss their potential
determinants, propose hypotheses to interpret them, and relate them to
the existing literature.
Finding 1: Consistent exporters adopt a markedly different set of busi-
ness practices. They also exhibit a common mindset about the impor-
tance of adopting these practices and a discourse that suggests that
they are mutually complementary.
One of the strongest regularities in our case studies is that consistent
exporters of differentiated goods to developed countries (i.e. consistent
exporters) implement a new set of export business practices.15 These
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from those prevailing in the domestic market. We divide export busi-
ness practices into three groups: “product” practices relate to the
identification of the products to focus on, “production” practices relate
to the design and actual production of the goods, and “marketing” prac-
tices relate to how goods are marketed and sold.
4.1. Product practices
In all our cases, we find that consistent exporters design products
to match the characteristics of demand in targeted foreign markets.
Demand in developed countries is different from domestic demand.
Some of the differences originate in these countries' higher require-
ments for quality and functional sophistication stemming from their
higher income. Other differences are due to demand idiosyncrasies of
countries. Designing products to match foreign demand requires firms
to understand both of these differences. As discussed below, consistent
exporters in our cases recognize this need and act consciously to acquire
the required knowledge. Furthermore, as demand characteristics evolve
over time, they secure information channels for keeping this knowledge
up to date. For example, theymay hire an international consultant to lay
out the basic parameters of a potential product or help local designers
introduce adjustments to the products they have designed. Those
adjustments are sometimes minimal but are nonetheless critical. By
contrast, acquiring knowledge about demand in the domestic market
is easier as it does not require an analogous systematic effort.
4.2. Production practices
Adapting products to foreign demand requires changes in the pro-
duction process. Particularly challenging is the need to upgrade quality
to satisfy the higher standards of consumers and distributors in high-
income markets. While consistent exporters sometimes need to invest
in newmachinery to achieve this goal, we find in our cases that invest-
ment requirements do not generally stand out as the most important
hurdle. Instead, the main challenge to upgrade quality seems to be pri-
marily associated with changing production techniques to gain better
control of production processes. Consistent exporters pay careful atten-
tion to howgoods are produced as small defects in the products can lead
to their rejection by foreign distributors or even the termination of the
business relationship. In the domestic market, such attention is not as
necessary since consumers are more tolerant of product imperfections.
In some cases, exporters also need to work closely with suppliers and
service providers to help them upgrade the quality of their own inputs
and services.
4.3. Marketing practices
Consistent exporters make great efforts to comply with the business
practices of distributors in developed countries. For example, they satisfy
their more rigorous expectations in terms of quality consistency and
timely delivery, as well as other specific requirements such as packaging
and back-office procedures. They alsomake substantive efforts to convey
early signals that they are serious about complying with those practices.
In addition, consistent exporters regard their distributors as a resource
not only to help them sell their products abroad but also to assist them
in understanding how markets are evolving. For branded products, ex-
porters need to develop an advertising strategy to position a new brand
in an unfamiliar market. At early stages in the process of export emer-
gence, firms also have to develop a specific strategy to confront the
“country-of-origin bias” stemming from the lack of an established reputa-
tion in the industry of the country from which they are exporting.1616 Under imperfect observability of a product's quality attributes at the time of purchase,
consumers might resort to the level of development of its country of origin as an extrinsic
cue of product quality (Bilkey and Nes, 1982; Verleigh and Steenkamp, 1999).Consistent exporters are keenly aware that this set of business
practices are dramatically different than those used on the domestic
market. Not only do they adopt these practices but also they emphati-
cally point to themas the key to establish a stable presence in developed
markets. They also display a commonmindset about the way of under-
standing how to sell products to the developed world and often
refer with derision to firms that attempt to export using the business
practices that prevail in the domestic market. Consistent exporters in
our cases never emphasized a specific practice as the “silver bullet”.
Instead, they appear to regard the adoption of each one of them as a
necessary condition for exporting. In fact, they frequently provide
examples about how failure to adopt a single practice (e.g. failing to
make a critical product adaptation or deliver a shipment in time)
could have jeopardized their entire export venture. The fact that they
regard each practice as critical implies that they view them asmutually
complementary.
Finding 2: In three of the sectors, an export pioneer, defined as the first
individual to implement the set of export business practices outlined
above, was also the first to become a consistent exporter. Export pioneers
have a knowledge advantage about foreign markets to which they were
previously exposed.
In the motorboat, television, and wine industries, one individu-
al (López Blanco, Levin, and Catena, respectively) was the first to
implement the set of export business practices outlined above.
We define these individuals as “export pioneers”. Export pioneers
were also the first to make exporting a stable, substantial, and
profitable part of their business. Some of the new business prac-
tices they adopted were visible to others who at first did not see
their logic and often derided their efforts. Later, these three export
pioneers became almost unanimously acknowledged in their industries
as the key actor associated with the origins of the industry's export
emergence.
In the wooden furniture industry, we did not find any individual or
firm that implemented the set of export business practices outlined
above. However, one individual (Jorge Etchebehere) was often singled
out as the person “who knows the most about exporting”. While this
person displays the mindset of consistent exporters and adopted most
export business practices, his export venture was not successful. Being
an intermediary and not a producer himself, he failed to establish a
quality control system on the geographically dispersed set of producers
he represented.
At the time export pioneers implemented the new set of business
practices, their distinguishing feature was the possession of a knowl-
edge advantage over industry peers about the characteristics of demand
in developedmarkets and their ways of conducting business. One strik-
ing common finding is that all three export pioneers exhibit a personal
history with a strong exposure to developed markets in countries that
are central to world trade in their industries. Furthermore, two of the
export pioneers – Levin (television) and López Blanco (motorboats) –
were importers in their sectorswith noprevious production experience.
The importing activity involved regular trips abroad, attendance to the
most important international trade fairs (in both cases held in Europe),
and business and social interactions with foreign producers and distrib-
utors. In the case of Catena (wines), he became familiar with the trans-
formation of the wine industry in the United States by socializing with
the most important winemakers and other actors in the wine business
community in Napa Valley during a timewhen he was a visiting profes-
sor at U.C. Berkeley. Even Etchebehere (furniture) had some, albeit
limited, foreign exposure when he was an exchange student in the
United States as a teenager and when he served as local liaison of U.S.
technical instructors at a U.S. multinational. In all these cases, the for-
eign exposure of these individuals preceded their idea of committing
to an export business.
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5.1. The importance of adopting export business practices
Consistent exporters adopt a new set of business practices. They also
emphasize the importance of doing it in their own discourse. This
finding suggests that adopting these practices is critical for becoming
an established exporter to developed countries. Further, the first indi-
viduals to do it are also thefirst to become consistent exporters to devel-
oped markets.
Business practices have been emphasized in studies of productivity
(Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010) and human resource management
(Ichniowski and Shaw, 2003). However, international trade scholars
have given little attention to the business practices that firms need
to adopt in order to export differentiated goods to developed countries.
Although various papers emphasize the need to change production
practices – mainly quality upgrading – for exporting to high-income
countries (e.g. Brambilla et al., 2012; Hallak and Sivadasan,
forthcoming; Iacovone and Javorcik, 2010; Manova and Zhang, 2012;
Sutton, 2007; Verhoogen, 2008), no attention has been given to changes
in product and marketing practices. In the case of product practices,
while we find that consistent exporters need to adapt their products
to tastes and needs of foreign consumers in developed countries,
models in international trade typically assume that firms export the
same products that they sell domestically. In the case of marketing
practices, our findings complement an incipient literature that studies
the relationship between local producers and foreign distributors. This
literature has mainly pointed to problems of matching (Antràs and
Costinot, 2011; Blum et al., 2013; Rauch and Watson, 2004) and
contracting (Antràs and Foley, 2011; Macchiavello, 2011) but has not
emphasized the importance of changing business practices to comply
with those of foreign distributors. Also, it does not highlight how
firms tap into these distributors as a source of information about foreign
markets.1719 We use the term embeddedness broadly to describe how the social relations of firms
provide themwith access to critical information for changing their business practices. We
drawon the original conception of this term as developed by Granovetter (1985) inwhich
he describes how social relations in business communities facilitate transactions between
different parties. Our findings also relate to the work of Granovetter (1973), Uzzi (1997)
and McDermott (2007) showing that a high degree of embeddedness in close-knit net-
works may hamper innovation due to limited access to non-redundant information
whereas, in contrast, innovation tends to come fromweaker social ties outside of that net-
work. In a similar vein, export pioneers in our cases establish social ties in a foreign net-
work. Albeit more limited in scope and intensity, those ties outside of their close-knit
domestic network allow them to understand how business practices need to be changed
in order to export.
20 We use the term embeddedness broadly to describe how the social relations of firms
provide themwith access to critical information for changing their business practices. We
drawon the original conception of this term as developed by Granovetter (1985) inwhich
he describes how social relations in business communities facilitate transactions between5.2. The foreign embeddedness of export pioneers as a gateway to acquiring
foreign market knowledge
We found that the three export pioneers in our cases had previous
experiences working and/or living in foreign markets. These experi-
ences seem to have played a critical role in enabling them to develop
a new mindset about how to approach foreign markets. We do not
think that it is coincidental that all three of them had such experiences.
Rather we believe that their foreign experiencewas critical in providing
them the knowledge they would need to develop effective practices for
foreign markets.
The theory of social networks emphasizes the role that social (or
embedded) ties play in facilitating the flow of subtle and nuanced infor-
mation as well as the transmission of tacit knowledge (Burt, 1992;
Granovetter, 1973, 2005; Powell, 1990).18 The previous experience of
export pioneers in developed countries enabled them to become
embedded in the business community of their industries in those coun-
tries. They became part, in different forms and degrees, of those foreign
networks. Thus, we hypothesize that their foreign embeddedness en-
abled them to acquire the knowledge necessary to develop the required
export business practices. We particularly emphasize the role of foreign
embeddedness in the adoption of product and marketing practices17 Based on interviews to U.S. international buyers in the bicycle and footwear industries,
Egan andMody (1992) highlight the importance of complying with distributors' business
practices and their role as a source of marketing information.
18 From an organizational knowledge perspective, Nonaka (1994) similarly argues that
“socialization” is the main channel for the transmission of tacit knowledge.since they are based on information and knowledge about foreign
markets that is – as we argue below – subtle, nuanced, and tacit.19
Designing products to meet foreign tastes in developed countries
requires understanding subtle and nuanced characteristics of foreign
demand. For example, apparently minor details may determine how
stylish consumers in a foreign country will regard specific features of a
product design.20 This knowledge is essentially tacit and hence difficult
to acquire by a producer in a developing country that has no access to
the foreign social networks where this knowledge resides. A critical
obstacle is the geographic and cultural distance (Kogut and Singh,
1988; Shenkar, 2001) that separates local producers from consumers
in developed markets. This distance renders information about these
markets difficult to access and interpret. These obstacles are larger for
the type of design-intensive consumer goods exemplified in our cases.
The appeal of such goods hinges largely on their aspirational value
and their ability to engage consumers' emotions. Since emotions and
aspirations are shaped by countries' specific cultural traits and collective
values, the need to engage them may impose insurmountable knowl-
edge requirements for a typical producer in a developing country.
Tacit knowledge about foreign markets is also required for adopting
marketing export business practices. For example, firms need to learn
about the business practices of foreign distributors and how to provide
signs that they can comply with those practices and become reliable
suppliers. Even clear requests for consistent quality or timely delivery
are often misinterpreted by producers in developing countries because
they are not accustomed to such requests. A potential reason for their
misunderstanding is that key information can only be understood in a
specific context that needs to be shared by the communicating parties
(Uzzi, 1997). Since local producers do not share the same context with
foreign distributors, they may fail to understand the importance of
satisfying their requests.
Other aspects of export pioneers' background, resources, and per-
sonality may also be important for their export success.21 However,
we emphasize their foreign embeddedness because we consider it the
gateway for their acquisition of foreign market knowledge. This knowl-
edge is particularly valuable at the initial stages in an industry's process
of export emergence when it is not yet widespread among domestic
producers. It is noteworthy that the foreign embeddedness of export
pioneers originated in previous activities carried out before they con-
ceived the idea of establishing an export business. Thus, we can treatdifferent parties. Our findings also relate to the work of Granovetter (1973), Uzzi (1997)
and McDermott (2007) showing that a high degree of embeddedness in close-knit net-
works may hamper innovation due to limited access to non-redundant information
whereas, in contrast, innovation tends to come fromweaker social ties outside of that net-
work. In a similar vein, export pioneers in our cases establish social ties in a foreign net-
work. Albeit more limited in scope and intensity, those ties outside of their close-knit
domestic network allow them to understand how business practices need to be changed
in order to export.
21 The case of Etchebehere in the furniture industry is an example of an individual who
possessed foreign market knowledge but failed, for other reasons, in his export venture.
30 A. Artopoulos et al. / Journal of Development Economics 105 (2013) 19–35their foreign embeddedness as exogenous to their subsequent decision
to become exporters.22
5.3. Foreign market knowledge versus production knowledge
Since adopting export business practices may not necessarily
improve the performance of a firm in the domestic market, it is not sur-
prising that domestically oriented firms do not do it to operate locally.
By contrast, it is difficult to understand why they often maintain their
domestic practices when they attempt to export, especially since they
could potentially buy the necessary knowledge. For example, firms
could hire an international consultant to help them adapt products or
upgrade quality. In our case studies, we find that firms often did not
hire such consultants because they did not recognize the importance
of addressing the different needs of foreign markets. We hypothesize
that firms are unaware of the importance of addressing those different
needs precisely because they cannot understand the specific ways
in which the foreign and the domestic markets differ.23 Often these
firms make substantive efforts to find export markets for their existing
products but do not examine potential export opportunities that
would require adapting these products to the needs of foreign clients
simply because they are not aware that making those adaptations is
critical.
Potential complementarities of export business practices could addi-
tionally help to explain why firms often do not upgrade quality or
adopt other production export business practices even when they
appear to possess the technological and organizational capability to do
so. Due to complementarities, the benefits of adopting production prac-
tices may not be substantial unless product and marketing export busi-
ness practices – which depend more heavily on tacit foreign market
knowledge – are also adopted.24 Finally, complementarities in business
practices have also been identified in human resource management
(Friel, 2011; Ichniowski and Shaw, 2003) and production practices for
quality upgrading (Kugler and Verhoogen, 2012) but they have not
been identified in the case of business practices required to export.
We think progress on this front can be achieved by designing surveys
to inquire about business practices of exporters and domestically-
oriented firms.
Our findings call into question the predominant focus that the inter-
national trade literature has placed on productivity as the key determi-
nant of whether firms export (e.g. Arkolakis, 2010; Bernard et al., 2003;
Melitz, 2003; Verhoogen, 2008).25 While productivity is naturally asso-
ciated with production knowledge, our findings suggest that the ability
to consistently export might be more closely related to the possession
of foreign market knowledge. In fact, in our case studies we did not en-
counter a single case of an entrepreneur ormanagerwho acknowledged
the importance of adopting production export business practices –
e.g. meeting the quality standards of developed countries – but regret-
ted not having the required technological or organizational capability.
Rather, we can generally attribute failure to upgrade quality or adopt
other production export business practices to an unawareness or insuf-
ficient conviction about the importance of doing so. Following on our
earlier discussion about the implications of complementarities, the22 The fact that their foreign exposurewas notmotivated by the prospect of later becom-
ing exporters also suggests that it might be too costly to pursue this experience with the
sole objective of acquiring foreign market knowledge.
23 Experiments in psychology find that people who are incompetent in the strategies
they adopt to reach success and satisfaction not only reach erroneous conclusions and
make unfortunate choices but also their incompetence robs them of their ability to realize
it: “the skills that engender competence in a particular domain are often the very same
skills necessary to evaluate competence in that domain” (Kruger and Dunning, 1999).
24 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this explanation.
25 An earlier literature emphasized the acquisition of technological capabilities as the
main determinant of industrial development (Amsden, 1989; Katz, 1984).adoption of production export business practiceswould appear to be ul-
timately determined by the possession of foreign market knowledge.
This hypothesis is consistent with evidence by Molina and Muendler
(2013) and Mion and Opromolla (2010) who show that firms are
more likely to export if they hire workers and managers with previous
work experience at exporting firms. It is also consistent with case-
study evidence showing that the possession of foreign market knowl-
edge is exhibited by many of the largest domestic manufacturers in
Ethiopia (Sutton and Kellow, 2010) and Ghana (Sutton and Kpentey,
2012), and by African exporters (Easterly and Reshef, 2010).5.4. Diffusion of export business practices and emergence of new exporting
sectors
The adoption of export business practices is not confined to export
pioneers. It has widely spread throughout the industry in television
and wines, the two sectors where export growth has been starker, and
it has been adopted by a few firms in motorboats.26 Since followers –
in contrast to export pioneers – are generally not embedded in foreign
business networks, their acquisition of foreign market knowledge
must rely on alternate channels of knowledge transmission. Here, we
develop the hypothesis that export pioneers spur a diffusion process
that eventually renders foreign market knowledge common wisdom
within the industry local business community. Although our findings
are too thin to uncover the actual channels of diffusion, we highlight
those that our findings suggest are the most relevant ones.
The adoption of export business practices by the export pioneer is
visible to other industry actors.While theymight not observe all the ac-
tions of pioneers, they realize that he is adopting a new set of business
practices and is making consistent efforts to export. Sometimes, export
pioneers are themselves open and vocal about what they are doing.
Their success has a demonstration effect. They set an observable bench-
mark that convinces others that there is a profitableway of approaching
foreign markets. We believe that this is the most important role of the
pioneer in the diffusion process.
The actions of export pioneers also transmit knowledge aboutmarkets
and products. For example, winemakers in Mendoza knew that Catena
was targeting the U.S. market and working with Cabernet Sauvignon
and Chardonnay grapes. The actions of pioneers transmit more specific
information as well. For instance, competitors might learn from suppliers
and former employees that the pioneer has hired an international consul-
tant or has implemented a certain type of technological upgrade. Export
pioneers also help followers by opening gates in foreign markets. In par-
ticular, they helpmitigate country-of-origin bias by establishing a positive
reputation for the country as a reliable producer in the industry.
We argue that the most important advantage of export pioneers rel-
ative to other domestic producers is their possession of knowledge that
is general, and hence diffusible. This knowledge is essentially the under-
standing that consumption patterns and business practices are system-
atically different in developed countries and the acknowledgment that
the way of doing business needs to be changed in order to address
those differences. We view this type of knowledge as general in the
sense that it can be widely used in the sector. We hypothesize that it is
susceptible to diffusion because it is manifest in the actions of pioneers,
which are visible as they adopt the set of export business practices.
In developed countries, this type of general diffusionwould be unnec-
essary for producers of differentiated products as they do not need to
bridge such a divide in consumption patterns and business practices in
order to export to other developed countries. The different environments
in which producers in developed and developing countries operate can
explain why international business studies that have long emphasized26 No firm has yet adopted the whole set of export business practices in furniture; i.e.
there is not even an export pioneer.
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tion (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, 1990; Madsen and Servais, 1997;
Sharma and Bomstermo, 2003) neglect the role of diffusion for acquiring
this type of knowledge. Diffusion is less likely to occur in their case stud-
ies because they focus on firms fromdeveloped countrieswhose knowl-
edge advantage consists of specific intricacies of foreignmarkets such as
commercial secrets, business contacts, and details of the competition
environment. While export pioneers in our cases might also be
familiar with such intricacies, their main advantage is the possession
of a more diffusible type of knowledge.
In the wine and television industries, multinationals entered the
sector at relatively early stages in the diffusion process and currently ac-
count for a substantial fraction of production and exports. Nevertheless,
in none of our cases is a multinational the export pioneer or one of the
earliest adopters. While multinationals possess foreign market knowl-
edge, they may be initially unconvinced that the business practices
required to serve developedmarkets can be implemented under existing
local conditions. Thus, they only enter the industry once the pioneer and
early followers, who combine foreign and domestic market knowledge,
demonstrate how this can be done.27
In contrast to the concerns of Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) about
the harmful effect of diffusion on the discovery activity, our findings
suggest that diffusion benefits more than harms export pioneers. Pio-
neers benefit from followers as they help develop brand recognition
for the country's industry and from various forms of cooperation such
as sharing stands at trade fairs, organizing trade missions jointly, or
cross-offering products abroad. Notwithstanding this difference be-
tween HR and our findings, the importance of diffusion in both studies
suggests that industries should be relevant units of analysis in the
study of export development.6. Conclusions and policy implications
Based on four case studies of new exporting sectors in Argentina, this
article investigates the underlying determinants of the ability of firms
from developing countries to successfully export differentiated goods
to the developed world. We find that themost significant challenge fac-
ing exporters of such goods lay not in resolving problems in production
but rather in acquiring knowledge about existing differences and evolv-
ing trends in the types of products demanded by consumers in these
countries and knowing how to work with their distributors. The foreign
embeddedness of export pioneers prior to engaging in their export
venture enables them to acquire this knowledge and adapt their busi-
ness practices accordingly. Their ability to integrate such knowledge
into their production processes and successfully export their goods to
developed countries sets a visible benchmark that enables future fol-
lowers to understand what business practices they would need to
change.
While export growth from developing countries has been largely
linked to the ability of firms to work in GVC dominated by large compa-
nies in the developed world (Gereffi, 1999; Humphrey and Schmitz,
2002), our article highlights an alternate way of exporting differentiated
goods that does not involve participating in them. Indeed, ourwork indi-
cates that multinationals may not be the first to initiate production in a
particular industry even if they eventually come to account for a signifi-
cant portion of exports. Consequently, since product andmarketingprac-
tices are greater hurdles for domestic firms, public policy for export
development that focuses solely on production would seem to be
misguided.27 Wagner and Zhaler (2013) find that export pioneers tend to be smaller than their fol-
lowers. They explain this finding with a model inwhich larger firms havemore choices to
allocate their managerial capacity and prefer to wait until their uncertainty is resolved by
the actions of smaller firms.The export of differentiated products requiring continual changes in
design would seem to offer middle-income developing countries like
Argentina the ability to resist the downward pressure on wages associ-
ated with the insertion in GVC and the production of commodities.
Hence, our findings suggest that public policy that seeks to promote
high-wage jobs should include export development policies that pro-
mote the diffusion of export business practices. Policy makers could,
for example, promote conferences through business associations and
educational institutions designed to facilitate the transmission of explic-
it and tacit knowledge from emerging pioneers to potential followers.
Overall exports from countries like Argentina may have been less spec-
tacular than exports from countries in Asia, not because firms have not
inserted themselves in GVC but rather because the majority of firms
have not come to understand the means for consistently exporting dif-
ferentiated products to the developed world.
Appendix A. Methodology
A.1. Quantitative identification of new exporting sectors
This appendix describes our procedure for identifying new exporting
differentiated-good sectors from customs data. Although our original
database reports Argentina's exports at the 6-digit level of the Harmo-
nized System (HS), we aggregate at the 4-digit level and use this level
of aggregation to conduct the statistical analysis of sectoral export
growth. We think that 4-digit categories best group products that
share similar technologies, labor-skill needs, distribution channels
and marketing requirements, and thus can be thought of as economic
sectors. There are 1328 4-digit HS categories.
We consider export growth between the average of the periods
1991–1994 and 2002–2005. The Argentine economy underwent a period
of drastic trade liberalization that was mostly complete by 1991. There-
fore, the choice of base period attempts to minimize the identification
of sectors with emerging export activity driven by sectoral reallocation
in response to trade liberalization. Averaging over four years prevents
exceptional peaks – sometimes driven by measurement error – from
dominating the measure of export growth.
We impose the following quantitative filters on the database. First,
we require exports in 2005 to be above the threshold value of US$
10 million to exclude categories that have insufficient economic signif-
icance. This amount represents 0.025% of total Argentine exports and
0.091% of industrial manufacturing exports in that year. This criterion
leaves 267 out of 1328 4-digit categories in the database. Second, we
rank the remaining 267 categories according to export growth between
1991–1994 and 2002–2005, and select only those in the top 40 percen-
tiles. Applying this criterion narrows the list to 106 4-digit categories.
Finally, among those 106 categories, we select only those that have
shippedmore than a third of their exports to OECD countries. The appli-
cation of this last filter results in a list of 30 4-digit sectors. Applying
Rauch's (1999) classification, 13 sectors can be classified as differentiated
(listed in Table A.1) and 17 as non-differentiated (listed in Table A.2).
Since categories in the Harmonized System do not necessarily corre-
spond to relevant economic sectors, the industries we choose for case
study do not exactly match the 4-digit categories used in the statistical
analysis. One of our sectors, wooden furniture, straddles HS category
9403 (“furniture NESOI and parts thereof”) and HS category 9401
(“seats (except barber, dental, etc.), and parts”). Both categories are
included in Table A.1. Another of our selected sectors, wines, coincides
with HS category 2204 (“wine of fresh grapes; grape must NESOI”).
Although this category is classified in Table A.2 as “non-differentiated”,
we consider this classification to be the result of an ambiguity created by
aggregation. Whereas this category is dominated by fine wines – a dif-
ferentiated product – in Argentina's exports, Rauch (1999) classifies
wine as a reference-price categorymaybe based on the category's inclu-
sion of grape must and table wine. A third of our sectors, motorboats, is
very hard to identify using customs data since not even at the finest
Fig. A.2. Evolution of argentine exports: Argentina 1980–2008.
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tonnage or length. Once properly defined, the motorboat industry
passes all the criteria established above, except for its value of ship-
ments which is slightly below the minimum threshold of US$ 10 mil-
lion. Finally, information about exports in our fourth sector, television
programs, is not included in customs data.
For a number of sectors listed in Tables A.1 and A.2, growth is pri-
marily driven by the increasing exploitation of resource-based compar-
ative advantage in response to trade liberalization and deregulation. For
instance, this is the case of copper ores (HS 2603), leather (HS 4107)
and wood boards (HS 4407, 4409 and 4421). A few other sectors are
highly idiosyncratic. On the one hand, nuclear reactors (HS 8401) are
exported by only one government-owned agency. On the other hand,
exports reported under “reaction initiators and accelerators and catalyst
preparations NESOI” (HS 3815), “turbojets, turbo propellers and other
gas turbines and parts” (HS 8411) and “aircraft” (HS 8802) correspond
to sales of used equipment, previously imported. Netting these sectors
out from the list and re-classifying wine as a differentiated product
places wines, seats and seat parts, and furniture at the top of an
export-ranked list of differentiated products with high export growth
and substantial orientation toward OECD markets.
Appendix B. Argentina's exports of differentiated goods to the OECD
After a decade of commercial protection and high inflation, in the
early 1990s the Argentine government instituted a drastic reform and
stabilization program that included unilateral trade liberalization, open-
ing of the capital account, removal of restrictions on FDI, privatization,
de-regulation, and a currency board that pegged the peso to theU.S. dol-
lar. Most of the decade witnessed high rates of economic growth and a
strong real appreciation of the domestic currency (Fig. A.1). The pro-
gram culminated in a severe financial, currency, and debt crisis that
took place in 2001 and 2002. The recovery from the crisis, however,
was rapid, and the rest of the 2000s until 2008 exhibited high rates of
economic growth associated with a depreciated domestic currency at
approximately half of the value of the multilateral real exchange rate
that prevailed in the 1990s.
Total exports picked up in the early 1990s as a result of the liberali-
zation program. They grew steadily over most of that decade but even-
tually stalled due to the loss of international competitiveness brought
about by the real appreciation of the peso, particularly after Brazil
devalued its currency in 1999. International competitiveness was
regained following the crisis and the large devaluation that ensued in
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Fig. A.1. GDP and real exchange rate: Argentina 1991–2008.decade. Fig. A.2 also shows that the share of differentiated products in
total exports from Argentina increased from 18% of total exports in
1980 to 32.7% in 2008. However, exports to the developing world, par-
ticularly neighboringMERCOSUR countries, explainmost of this growth.
As a result, exports of differentiated products to OECD countries have
consistently accounted for less than 10% of Argentina's total exports.
For comparison, Fig. A.3 shows the evolution of this same share
between 1980 and 2006 across regions in the world. In most regions
of the developing world, the share of differentiated goods exported to
OECD countries has increased considerably, albeit largely based on ex-
ports of apparel (SITC 84). This is true for Central America, North Africa,
Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and particularly South Asia. By con-
trast, South America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Oil abundant economies
all exhibit stagnant shares of differentiated-good exports to the OECD
under 10% of total exports. The weak performance of South America is
particularly interesting in the context of our study as it shows that
Argentina's apparent lack of international competitiveness in this type
of exports is not exceptional in the region.0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
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Fig. A.3. Share of diff. exports to OECD in total exports: 1980–2006.
Table A.2
High growth, high value sectors with large exports to OECD. Non-differentiated.
HS4 Exports To Growtha Description
2005 OECD
(US$ M) (%)
2603 1026.9 42 318,783 Copper ores and concentrates
2204 303.7 67 6.8 Wine of fresh grapes; grape must NESOI
4107 268.1 41 57.8 Leather of animals NESOI, no hair NESOI
7210 166.6 51 6.3 fl-rl iron & na steel nun600mmwd, clad etc.
7108 145.4 70 16.2 Gold (incl plat plated), unwr, semimfr or powder
2008 130.5 70 5.4 Fruit, nuts etc. prepared or preserved NESOI
2905 110 65 5.3 Acyclic alcohols & halogenat, sulfonatd etc. derivs
806 75.7 60 5.2 Grapes, fresh or dried
7224 54 99 1144.5 Alloy steel NESOI in ingots, oth pr frm & semif pr
2302 52.1 91 5.1 Bran, sharps etc. from working cereals & leg plants
7214 39.6 64 8.5 Bars & rods, iron & na steel NESOI, h–r etc.
2827 38 70 149.2 Chlorides etc.; bromides etc.; iodides etc.
2901 30.1 60 27.1 Acyclic hydrocarbons
810 28.9 99 126.8 Fruit NESOI, fresh
3913 24.9 34 166.4 Natural (inc modified) polymers NESOI, primary forms
2836 19.4 62 21.6 Carbonates; peroxocarbonates; comm amm carbonate
811 11.1 72 434.6 Fruit & nuts (raw or cooked by steam etc.), frozen
39,876 69 2.4 Total exports
a Growth: ratio between the average for 2002–2005 and the average for 1991–1994.
Table A.1
High growth, high value sectors with large exports to OECD. Differentiated.
HS4 Exports To Growtha Description
2005 OECD
(US$ M) (%)
3815 41 36 13.1 Reaction initiators & acceler & catalyt prep NESOI
9403 36.3 36 5 Furniture NESOI and parts thereof
4409 30.4 93 49.3 Wood, continuously shaped (tongued, grooved etc.)
6907 27.2 94 32.4 Unglazed ceramic flags & paving, hearth tiles etc.
8401 17.6 100 6.6 Nuclear reactors; fuel elem (n-i); mach isotop sep
8455 17.5 51 5.7 Metal-rolling mills and rolls therefor; parts
8516 12.5 35 4.6 Elec water, space & soil heaters; hair etc. dry, pt
4421 12 89 16.7 Articles of wood, NESOI
8411 11.9 50 11.8 Turbojets, turbopropellers & oth gas turbines, pts
6109 10.4 47 14.7 t-Shirts, singlets, tank tops etc., knit or crochet
39,876 69 2.4 Total exports
a Growth: ratio between the average for 2002–2005 and the average for 1991–1994.
Table A.3
List of interviews.
Case Organization Type of organization Position Date Location
Motorboats Altamar Company Production Director Jul 05, 2006 San Fernando, Buenos Aires,
Argentina
Motorboats Altamar Company Commercial Director Jul 05, 2006 San Fernando, Buenos Aires,
Argentina
Motorboats CACEL Chamber Director Mar 27, 2006 San Fernando, Buenos Aires,
Argentina
Motorboats CEE Company Owner/CEO Jun 28, 2006 San Fernando, Buenos Aires,
Argentina
Motorboats CEE Company Owner/CEO Dec 19, 2010 San Fernando, Buenos Aires,
Argentina
Motorboats CEE Company Owner/CEO Jul 20, 2012 San Fernando, Buenos Aires,
Argentina
Motorboats GG Yacht Designer Yacht Designer Owner/CEO Jul 07, 2006 Olivos, Buenos Aires,
Argentina
Motorboats Segue Company Owner/CEO Aug 10, 2006 San Fernando, Buenos Aires,
Argentina
TV programs Fox Broadcaster Manager Jun 27, 2006 Milan, Italy (by phone)
TV programs Promofilm Company Owner/CEO Jun 20, 2006 City of Buenos Aires,
Argentina
(continued on next page)
33A. Artopoulos et al. / Journal of Development Economics 105 (2013) 19–35
Table A.3 (continued)
Case Organization Type of organization Position Date Location
TV programs Promofilm Company Owner/CEO Jul 06, 2012 City of Buenos Aires,
Argentina
TV programs Promofilm Company Senior Vice President
Development and Production
Jun 13, 2006 City of Buenos Aires,
Argentina
TV programs Tandem Company Owner/CEO Oct 10, 2006 City of Buenos Aires,
Argentina
TV programs TELEFE Consultant Consultant Jun 22, 2006 City of Buenos Aires,
Argentina
TV programs TELEFE International Company International Manager Oct 24, 2006 City of Buenos Aires,
Argentina
Wines Asociación Argentina de Consorcios
Regionales de Experimentación Agraria
(AACREA)
NGO of agricultural research
and improvement
Regional Coordinator Jul 14, 2006 Mendoza, Argentina
Wines Catena Zapata Company Winemaker Sep 27, 2006 Mendoza, Argentina
Wines Catena Zapata Company Owner/CEO Nov 16, 2006 City of Buenos Aires,
Argentina
Wines Chandon Company Export Manager Sep 25, 2006 City of Buenos Aires,
Argentina
Wines COVIAR (Corporación Vitivinícola
Argentina)
Wine Umbrella Association Director Jul 20, 2006 City of Buenos Aires,
Argentina
Wines Diageo Company Export Manager Oct 30, 2006 City of Buenos Aires,
Argentina
Wines Fecovita (Federación de Cooperativas
Vitivinícolas Argentinas)
Cooperative Export Manager Sep 28, 2006 Mendoza, Argentina
Wines Flichman Company Vice President/CEO Aug 29, 2006 City of Buenos Aires,
Argentina
Wines Grupos CREA Farm improvement
association
Manager Jul 14, 2006 City of Buenos Aires,
Argentina




Director Sep 28, 2006 Mendoza, Argentina




Manager Sep 28, 2006 Mendoza, Argentina
Wines La Agrícola S.A. Company Director/Owner Sep 30, 2006 Mendoza, Argentina
Wines Peñaflor Company Export Director Aug 30, 2006 City of Buenos Aires,
Argentina
Wines Schroeder Family Company Export Manager Jul 14, 2006 City of Buenos Aires,
Argentina
Wines Trivento Company Export Manager Sep 25, 2006 Mendoza, Argentina
Wines Wines of Argentina Wine Export Association Manager Sep 11, 2006 City of Buenos Aires,
Argentina
Wines Wines of Argentina Wine Export Association Director Jul 12, 2006 City of Buenos Aires,
Argentina
Wooden furniture CAFYDMA Association Director Mar 10, 2006 City of Buenos Aires,
Argentina
Wooden furniture FAIMA (Federación Argentina de la
Industria de la Madera y Afines)
Chamber Director Jul 13, 2006 City of Buenos Aires,
Argentina
Wooden furniture Ivope Company Export Manager Nov 10, 2006 San Jerónimo Norte, Santa
Fe, Argentina
Wooden furniture Jorge Etchebehere Trading Co Broker Owner Dec 09, 2006 City of Buenos Aires,
Argentina
Wooden furniture Jorge Etchebehere Trading Co Broker Owner Sep 12, 2006 City of Buenos Aires,
Argentina
Wooden furniture Mehring Designer Designer Nov 12, 2006 Esperanza, Santa Fe,
Argentina
Wooden furniture Mehring Company Owner/CEO Jul 27, 2006 Buenos Aires, Argentina
Wooden furniture Reno Company Owner/CEO Nov 10, 2006 Alvarez, Santa Fe, Argentina
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